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Abstract 
After the socio-economic transformation and the establishment of the free market 
institutions, the development and improvement of living standards in post-transition 
economies are deemed to depend more and more on the so called secondary 
‘generating’ reforms, at the core of which is the good governance. Drawing from this 
approach, this article seeks to address the role and the effect of the good governance 
in the economic development of the Western Balkan countries. More specifically, the 
article investigates the impact of good governance in the rates of economic growth 
of GDP. The article adopts a quantitative methodology approach, i.e. an econometric 
model based on the examination of a panel – data of good governance indicators for 
Western Balkan countries for the period 1996 – 2012. The analysis concentrates on 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and 
Serbia. 
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Introduction 
This article aims at identifying the correlation between good governance and 
economic growth in the Western Balkan countries. After the political change in the 
1990s, the economic development of these countries, for several years, was 
characterized by high economic growth rates, benefiting from the new political 
system based on democracy and transformation of economy towards the free market 
one. Growth rates of GDP, in most Western Balkan countries, particularly prior to 
2008, have been much higher than in West European countries. However, this 
positive development is accompanied with many lacks and critics regarding good 
governance; particularly in the area of corruption, law enforcement, property rights, 
etc.  
Many political and economic scholars argue that good governance is one of the main 
factors, not only for the democratic development of the country, but it is also one of 
the primary factors in the economic growth. But some others are critical of this 
approach, arguing that this correlation can be only theoretical and there is not 
enough evidence to support it. 
In this light, the main research question refers to the attempt to confirm the 
correlation between improvement of governance and economic growth in Western 
Balkan countries. Based on the positive data of economic growth on one side, and 
problematic aspects of good governance in these countries on the other, the main 
hypotheses is that in the Western Balkans, there is no clear evidence to support a 
positive correlation between good governance and economic growth. 
The methodological approach of this article is rather simple and as follows: upon 
completion of a literature review, the article analyses through descriptive 
interpretation the data on economic growth in Western Balkan countries and at the 
same time, for the same period, the indicators of good governance are also 
examined as estimated by international institutions. Further, the article presents an 
econometric model, which shows the relation between good governance and 
economic growth for different countries in the Western Balkans. 
From the statistical point of view, the article uses the databases of the World Bank 
(World Governance Indicators - WGI), which bring together considerable data and 
statistical indicators from different economic, social and political international 
institutions. It is necessary to emphasize that this article does not seek to evaluate 
or discuss neither the content nor the reliability of the data published by the WGI.  
The analysis, as stated above, relates only to the region of the Western Balkans, 
and thus includes seven countries: Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, 
Macedonia (FYROM), Montenegro and Serbia. Drawing conclusions on the 
correlation between good governance and economic growth based on data for only 
seven cases might certainly have some weaknesses in argumentation. However, the 
presented work does not aim to draw general and universal theoretical conclusions, 
but only to illustrate the above correlation in this region. 
It is also necessary to remark that the analysis focuses on the period from 1996 to 
2012. This relatively short period is related to the radical political and economic 
change in the Western Balkans, which started in the beginning of the 1990s.For the 
purposes of this analysis, it is not relevant to take into analysis the period before 
these changes occurred in the. This implies that the conclusions of the article should 
be considered only for this specific period and can be different in the long run. 
Following the introduction, the paper will continue with three other sections: section 
2 will present the variation of good governance indicators in Western Balkan 
countries; section 3 shows the positive economic growth in the region; and section 
4 analyzes the correlation between economic growth and good governance. The 
results of econometric model are shown in annexes at the end of the paper. 
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Literature review 
Many theoretical as well as empirical studies are dedicated to evidencing the relation 
between good governance and economic growth. There is a common acceptance 
that good governance is one of the main factors, not only for the democratic 
development of the country, but it is also a primary factor in the economic 
development. In this regard, Hall and Jones (1999) stress that the difference 
between economic developments in different countries, productivity, accumulation 
of capital etc., can be explained essentially by the difference in social structure. ‘The 
central hypothesis … is that the primary, fundamental determinant of a country's 
long-run economic performance is its social infrastructure. By social infrastructure, 
we mean the institutions and government policies that provide the incentives for 
individuals and firms in an economy’ (Hall and Jones, 1999). In this regard the 
evaluation of Kaufmann (2003) is rather interesting, in which he analyzes the 
economic development of a certain number of countries for a long period (from 1970 
still the beginning of 2000), and concludes that the slowing of growth rate of this last 
period (2002-2003) is not related only to the macroeconomic situation of certain 
countries, but also to the stagnation or the lowering of some of wellbeing standards, 
as are quality of the institutional structure, independence of the judiciary, level of 
corruption and the ease of doing business. Such results are also drawn by Roll and 
Talbott (2003), who conclude that about 80 percent of differences in GNI per capita 
between different countries ,can be explained by such factors as property rights, 
political rights, governance expenses, freedom of speech, etc., while negative effects 
come from excessive administrative regulation, informal economy, trade barriers, 
etc. 
From a historical point of view, a particular approach is given by Acemoglu, Robinson 
and Jonson (2002). Based on empirical data, they argue why among colonized 
European countries, those who were wealthier in the 16th century, now after 500 
years, are relatively poorer. According to them, this difference cannot be explained 
simply by the impact of geographic factors, but exactly from the role of political 
institutions in the economic development of these countries 
As many authors highlight, good governance is seen as a key element in the 
economic development particularly in the developing countries. This thesis is related 
mostly to the fact that these countries inherit a limited market infrastructure which 
requires reforming governance initiatives to speed up free market initiatives and 
raise production (Khan, 2007). Based on empirical analysis, Khan (2007) argues for 
a substantial correlation between good governance and an increase of income per 
capita, seeing good governance as an important factor in economic growth. 
In this framework, the so called ‘secondary generating reforms’, which have in their 
core good governance, are considered nowadays more and more important for the 
Eastern European countries, including the Western Balkans. Why ‘secondary’? The 
primary reforms in these countries are considered those that are related to the 
transformation of the country from a centralized economy to a free market system, 
the essence of which is establishing of free market institutions, i.e. privatizing, 
liberalization of economy, fiscal reform, building up of a new financial system, etc. 
After these reforms take place, the development of these countries is primarily 
related to good governance, in all aspects of this concept. 
Drawing from this interrelation between good governance and economic growth, the 
question posed is: how can we evaluate good governance? Is it possible to have 
unique indicators/indices to determine all dimensions of ‘good governance’? As 
stated above, this is related to the market and particularly with its efficiency. In this 
way Knack (1995) determines five main indicators characterizing good governance: 
(i) corruption; (ii) legal framework; (iii) public administration efficiency; (iv) lack of 
contract execution by the government; and (v) expropriation. Knack aggregates 
above indices in one aggregated index, so named ‘property right index’, which is 
evaluated from 0 (lowest) to 50 (highest). 
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The World Bank has considered as a good governance index the one from 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005), which groups it in six main pillars: (i) 
accountability and responsibility of governance – assessment of political and human 
rights; (ii) political stability and lack of violence – assessment of violent and terroristic 
acts; (iii) governance efficiency – the quality of public services; (iv) legal framework 
– assessment of politics which stumble the free market; (v) law enforcement – 
implementation of contracts, court verdicts, etc. (vi) corruption control – abuse of 
office for personal profits. 
From a general review of the literature on economic growth and good governance, 
there should be mentioned that some authors are critical of this approach, showing 
that this correlation can be only theoretical and there is not enough evidence to 
support it (Kurtz and  and Shrank, 2007). According to them the relation between 
economic growth and good governance can be obvious only in developed countries 
or in a very long period of time. In this context, this article seeks to test this hypothesis 
in the case of the Western Balkan countries. It aims at identifying the correlation 
between good governance and economic growth in this region. 
Governance indicators in the Western Balkan 
countries 
When attempting to analyze the impact of good governance in economic growth, the 
first problem that rises is that of definition, i.e. what do we mean by ‘good 
governance’. It is a broad concept and in many aspects very difficult to measure, 
particularly in quantitative figures. For that reason in the political-economic literature 
there is no clear definition of this concept. However, the object of this article is not to 
analyze the problematic aspects related with indicators that are used to express the 
level of good governance of a country. From this point of view, this article adopts the 
definition of the World Bank regarding ‘good governance’ as provided in 2002 and 
later in 2007. In 2002 the World Bank defined the governance as ‘The ability of the 
state to provide those institutions that support growth and poverty reduction-often 
referred to as good governance-is essential to development’ (World Bank, 2002).The 
later definition was within the same perception (World Bank), in which governance 
is defined as ‘...the manner in which public officials and institutions acquire and 
exercise the authority to shape public policy and provide public goods and services.’ 
(World Bank, 2007). 
To have a clearer definition, today we mostly refer to the Kaufmann and Kraay (2008) 
classification, which classifies governance indicators in two groups based on two 
main criteria: (a) what do they measure (b) on what sources and opinions they are 
based. Further, the first group of indicators includes two categories: (a.1) indicators 
who value the law enforcement or specific rules; and (a.2) indicators who value the 
concrete results of governance, specific politics or the outputs of this politics. 
Regarding the second group of indicators, which means where they are based, 
(sources, opinions, etc.), governance indicators are classified in two other 
categories: (b.1) indicators which result from evaluation of different experts, and (b.2) 
indicators which reflect the results of a sample’s observation from groups of 
individuals and firms. Although both methods have their weaknesses, this type of 
classification is important for the analysis and the results presented below. 
In this framework, the analysis of good governance for Western Balkan countries is 
based on the six main indicators defined by the World Bank, (Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi, 2005), elaborated for the period 1996 – 2012.  
1. Accountability of Governance. 
2. Political stability and lack of violence. 
3. Governance efficiency. 
4. Legal framework. 
5. Law enforcement. 
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6. Corruption control. 
The evaluation of these indicators form the World Bank is made by ranking 230 
countries on the bases of percentiles, meaning the percentage of other countries 
that have a lower indicator that the given country. [Information about the 
elaboration’s sources of indices can be found in ‘Worldwide Governance Indicators’ 
for respective Countries 1992–2012.] The better the ranking, the more positive is 
considered the index of that country, because the percentage of the other countries 
which have a lower performance will be higher. Meantime, the World Bank makes 
an evaluation of each indicator of governance from –2.5 (bad performance) to +2.5 
(good performance). Since this paper focuses on the analysis of the effect of good 
governance in Western Balkan countries, the analysis is not based on the ranking of 
the countries (percentile), but on the evaluation from -2.5 to +2.5. It is clear that the 
higher the evaluation, the higher the ranking of the country will be. The value for 
these indicators for Western Balkan countries in 2012 are shown in Table 1.  
Table 1. Good governance indicators in Western Balkan Countries in 2012 (Index 
valuation and ranking in 230 countries) 
  ALB BIH HRV KSV MKD MNE SRB 
Voice and 
Accountability 
Index 
valuation 10 -0.14 0.48 -0.22 0.00 0.23 0.17 
Rank 50 45 64 42 50 56 56 
Political Stability 
& no Violence 
Index 
valuation -0.16 -0.54 0.58 -1.15 -0.44 0.56 -0.22 
Rank 40 29 64 15 33 64 39 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Index 
valuation -0.28 -0.47 0.70 -0.39 -0.07 0.13 -0.11 
Rank 45 39 72 42 52 60 51 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Index 
valuation 0.17 -0.06 0.44 -0.04 0.35 0.01 -0.08 
Rank 56 51 67 53 61 53 51 
Rule of Law 
Index 
valuation -0.57 -0.23 0.21 -0.56 -0.24 -0.01 -0.39 
Rank 35 48 60 36 48 55 44 
Control of 
Corruption 
Index 
valuation -0.72 -0.30 -0.04 -0.62 0.02 -0.10 -0.31 
Rank 27 49 57 30 59 55 48 
Source: World Bank, Worldwide Development Indicators – Data (WDI), 2013 
The first indicator is the ‘accountability of governance’. The variation of the evaluation 
of this indicator for Western Balkan countries is shown in Graph 1. 
29 
 
Pere ● Governance and economic development of Western Balkan countries  
Graph 1.Accountability of Governance (1996 – 2012) 
 
Source: World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), 2013 
As shown in the graph, this indicator shows an improvement for all the countries in 
the period 1996 - 2000 and a relative stabilization after 2001. In general, for this 
group of countries the index is between -0.5/+0.5 (ranking 45 – 55 from about 230 
countries). The highest evaluation is for Croatia while the lowest is for Kosovo (-0.22 
in 2012). 
Graph 2. Political stability and no violence (1996 – 2012) 
 
Source: World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), 2013. 
The data for Montenegro are from 2006 and for Kosovo from 2008. 
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Regarding the ‘political stability and lack of violence’ (the second indicator, Graph 2), 
the indices vary between -1,0 / +1.0, and ranks vary from15 for Kosovo, to 64 for 
Croatia and Montenegro in 2012.The overall and significant characteristic is that, 
with exception of Croatia and Montenegro, all other countries have currently a 
negative sign rating, lower than the average level (zero). For Kosovo, although the 
index has been very positive in 2008 (the first year of calculation of this indicator), 
there has been a significant drop in the next years. A characteristic for three other 
countries, Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina and Macedonia, is that the index suffered a 
decrease in the same year, 2011, reflecting the local insurgences that year; later in 
2012 the evaluation improved. 
Graph 3. Governance efficiency (1996 – 2012) 
 
 Source: World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), 2013. 
The data for Montenegro are from 2006 and for Kosovo from 2008. 
Graph 3 shows the dynamics of the third index, ‘governance efficiency’. Even here it 
is shown that except for Croatia and Montenegro, the other countries have a negative 
index, with slight positive trends. The ranking of the countries (2012) is from 39 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina), to 72 (Croatia, distinguished from other countries).  
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Graph 4. Legal Framework (1996 – 2012) 
 
Source: World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), 2013. 
The data for Montenegro are from 2005 and for Kosovo from 2007. 
The fourth index ‘legal framework’ is seen in Graph 4. From the graph a considerable 
improvement is seen, for almost all countries, especially in the years 2003 to 2004. 
A characteristic of Croatia is that, although it is still better than the others, the index 
has slightly decreased after 2009. 
Graph 5. Law Enforcement (1996 – 2012) 
 
Source: World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), 2013. 
The data for Montenegro and for Kosovo are from 2003. 
Graph 5 presents the evaluation of the ‘law enforcement’ index (rule of law). It is 
undoubtedly one of the most negative indicators for the Western Balkans. With the 
exception of Croatia, the assessment is negative, despite the improvements starting 
from 2003. In 2012, (excluding Croatia), the evaluation is between -0.01 
(Montenegro) and -0.57 (Albania). The ranking of the countries for 2012 is in the 
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range between 35-55 respectively for Albania and Montenegro (excluding Croatia 
which occupies the rank 60). This means that these countries have the better index 
regarding law enforcement, compared with only 35 - 55 percent of 230 countries 
surveyed in this analysis. 
Graph 6. Corruption Control (1996 – 2012) 
 
Source: World Bank, Worldwide GovernanceIndicators (WGI), 2013. 
The data for Montenegro and for Kosovo are from 2003. 
Graph 6 shows another negative indicator for the Western Balkans, the ‘control of 
corruption’. For 2012, with the exception of Macedonia (0,02) all other countries are 
below zero and there is no improvement for the entire period analyzed. The index is 
quite problematic and varied from Macedonia 0,02; Croatia -0.04; Montenegro -0.10; 
Bosnia and Herzegovina -0.30; Serbia -0.21; to Kosovo and Albania respectively -
0.62 -0.72. Albania and Kosovo have ranked respectively 27 and 30 (that are better 
compared with only 27 and 30 percent of countries) while other countries are in the 
range from 48 to 59. 
Regarding good governance in Western Balkan countries, we may refer also to 
Penev (2012), who conducts a profound analysis of some aspects of the reforms 
undertaken in the region and underlines in detail the weaknesses of their introduction 
and implementation. In this point of view, we should underline for example: gaps in 
low enforcement; corruption levels; weaknesses of legal system in the area of rule 
of law, property rights, and judicial independence; insufficient cooperation between 
the governments and the respective parliaments; lack of capacities for regulatory 
impact analysis, etc. 
Economic growth in Western Balkan countries  
In macroeconomic terms, GDP has been one of the most positive and stable 
indicators in the Western Balkans. In 2007, the GDP growth in the region, compared 
with average growth of GDP in the 27 countries of the European Union (EU 27), 
shows that the Balkan Countries have had a rapid economic growth. During the 
years 2005 - 2007, GDP growth in the region has been higher than the EU on 
average 6-7 percent. Even in 2008, when the economic crisis began in European 
industrialized economies, Western Balkan countries had a positive growth on an 
average of 5.5 percent. The slowdown in economic growth in the region began in 
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2009 in almost all countries. The decline was particularly significant in Croatia (-
6.8%), Macedonia (-5.8%) and Serbia (-3.1%).  
Graph 7. Growth of GDP (1996 – 2012) 
 
Source: World Bank, Worldwide Development Indicators – Data (WDI), 2013 
Graph 8. Growth GDP per capita (1996 – 2012) 
 
Source: World Bank, Worldwide Development Indicators – Data (WDI), 2013 
Graphs 7 and 8 report the growth rates of GDP and GDP per capita for the Western 
Balkan in the period 1996-2012. As seen from the two graphs, rates of growth were 
satisfactory, but have been getting lower after 2008. The decline is particularly more 
evident in the years 2009-2012, where several countries have had also negative 
rates. 
ALB BIH HRV KSV MKD MNE SRB
1996 9,10 88,96 5,92 1,18 7,80
1998 12,70 15,60 1,98 3,38 4,90 0,70
2000 7,30 5,50 3,75 4,55 3,10 5,34
2002 2,90 5,30 4,88 -0,70 0,85 1,90 4,12
2004 5,90 6,10 4,13 2,61 4,63 4,40 9,30
2006 5,00 6,20 4,94 6,00 5,03 8,60 3,60
2008 7,70 5,42 2,08 6,90 4,95 6,90 3,80
2010 3,50 0,70 -1,41 3,90 2,89 2,50 1,01
2012 0,80 -0,70 -2,00 3,80 -0,27 0,50 -1,70
-3,00
2,00
7,00
12,00
17,00
ALB BIH HRV KSV MKD MNE SRB
1996 9,65 90,88 10,04 0,77 8,22
1998 12,90 12,27 3,59 2,28 5,05 1,79
2000 7,72 3,23 6,75 3,65 3,13 5,68
2002 3,61 4,81 4,88 -0,77 0,40 1,77 4,17
2004 6,66 6,35 4,15 2,54 4,38 4,19 9,56
2006 5,55 6,33 4,98 5,15 4,84 8,42 4,01
2008 8,03 5,62 2,13 6,04 4,84 6,75 4,24
2010 3,53 0,90 -1,16 3,07 2,81 2,39 1,42
2012 0,54 -0,56 -1,69 2,91 -0,35 0,43 -1,23
-3,00
2,00
7,00
12,00
17,00
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Good governance and economic growth in Western 
Balkan countries 
From the previous presentation of governance indicators set by the World Bank 
(Graphs 1 to 6) and growth rates (Graphs 7 and 8), is noted that while governance 
indicators have not been optimistic, the rates of economic growth (GDP) were 
satisfactory (at least until 2008). This indicates the fact that economic growth in these 
countries should not significantly have been affected by the improvement of good 
governance, but normally by other factors. Among these, we may include: the 
primary reforms related to privatization, opening of these economies to international 
trade, changes in the structure of the economy, increasing demand in the 
unsaturated markets, etc. 
To analyze in more detail such indications, and in order to measure the impact of 
good governance in the economic growth in Western Balkan countries, the following 
econometric model is used: 
gdpoecdλgcflogλ  extgdlogλ
log
321
1996/
++
++++++++= CrrLawRreEffStbAccGDPaGr capgdp γϕεδβα
(1) 
In this model the indicators of good governance are those set by the World Bank 
(Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2010). In (1) Grgdp/cap represents economic growth 
(growth of GDP per capita); logGDP1996 is the logarithm of the GDP per capita for 
the base year of the study (1996); inclusion of this noted variable in the model 
becomes important because countries with lower income per capita, should have the 
largest percentage increase; Acc represents the governance indicator that reflects 
the ‘governance accountability’ (Voice and Accountability); Stb is an indicator 
representing ‘political stability and lack of violence’ (Political Stability and no 
Violence); Eff is the indicator of ‘governance efficiency’ (Governance Effectiveness);
Rre  is the indicator which expresses the ‘administrative and regulatory framework’ 
(Regulatory Quality); Law is the index that characterizes the level of ‘law 
enforcement’ (Rule of Law); Crr represents index of corruption’s level ‘(Control of 
Corruption). 
To ensure the same assessment of impact on the dependent variable (Grgdp/cap), the 
above indicators are normalized with X = 0 and SD = 1. 
In this model three other variables are included, which are considered to affect in a 
considerable way economic growth, although not directly related to governance): 
extgdlog, it is the logarithm of trade opening index of the economy, which shows the 
percentage of exports and imports to total GDP; gcflog, which is the logarithm of the 
ration of capital formation to GDP and gdpoecd, which represents economic growth 
of GDP per capita in OECD countries. Inclusion of extgdlog based on the assumption 
that the more an economy is open to international markets, the more substantial its 
growth will be, while the variable which is linked to the capital formation, gcflog, 
presupposes that the growth of capital formation to GDP will affect faster economic 
growth. Further, gdpoecd variable is included based on assuming that economic 
development of Western Balkan countries, as relatively small economies, is affected 
by the economic growth on developed countries (OECD). 
Evaluation of coefficients in model (1) is based on the World Bank database for the 
Western Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, 
Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia). The period taken in analysis is from 1996 to 
2012. For some years during this period, particularly for Montenegro and Kosovo, 
there are no records, so they are completed using noted statistical methods (moving 
average). 
Drawing conclusions on the correlation between good governance and economic 
growth based on data for only seven cases might certainly have some weaknesses 
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in argumentation. However, this work does not aim to draw general, overreaching 
and universal theoretical conclusions, but only to illustrate the above correlation in 
this region. It is also necessary to remark, that the analysis focuses on the period 
from 1996 to 2012. This relatively short period is related to the radical political and 
economic change in the Western Balkans, which started in the beginning of the 
1990s. For the purposes of this analysis, it is not relevant to take into analysis the 
period before these changes occurred. This implies that the conclusions of the article 
should be considered only for this specific period and can be different in the long 
run.  
On this basis, panel data are built which are processed in STATA. The results are 
presented in Annex 1. In this annex it is noted that:  
growth of GDP per capita (gdpcap), is statistically significant correlated from: (1) 
good governance efficiency (eff, p = 000), (2) the administrative regulatory 
framework (rre, p = 0,076), (3) law enforcement (law, p = 0,089), (4) income per 
capita in the base year (log96, p = 0.039), (5) share of capital formation to GDP 
(gcflog, p = 0,003) and (6) growth of GDP per capita in developed OECD countries 
(gdpoecd, p = 0,029). The link between economic growth and political stability is not 
statistically significant (stb, p = 0.136). While the results for the other indicators (acc, 
crr and extgdlog) show that the correlation is not statistically significant. 
Taking statistically significant results, the data indicate that there is a positive 
correlation between the economic growth and (1) rule of law (law), (2) economic 
growth in OECD countries (gdpoecd), and in particular (3), the rate of capital 
formation to GDP (gcflog). 
In the meantime, the data show anomalies in correlation between economic growth 
and governance efficiency (eff), administrative regulation (rre), and the level of 
corruption (crr). For these indicators the coefficients are negative (respectively -8.22, 
-2.59 and -0.58), which means that the improvement of these indicators has not 
contributed to economic growth as might be thought. Anomalies can be noted also 
in positive dependence of economic growth, from the initial level of income (year 
1996), as is normally assumed that the greater is the basis of departure (beginner 
level), the smaller will be the rates of growth. 
After eliminating from the model any variables that are not statistically significant, the 
regression is repeated and the results are presented in Annex 2. Results show that 
the correlation of economic growth from analyzed variables is statistically significant 
(although for stb, p = 0.166). From indicators that characterize good governance, 
positive impact on economic growth have been those related to political stability and 
absence of violence (stb) and the improvements in law enforcement (law). It is also 
a positive impact of capital formation to GDP (gcflog), and economic growth in OECD 
countries (gdpoecd). The anomalies are observed in the impact of governance 
efficiency (eff) and regulatory reforms in the administrative context (rre). 
As mentioned above, in the economic literature there is a common agreement that 
good governance is an important factor in economic growth. The data analyzed 
above shows that for the Western Balkan countries, only specific aspects that 
characterize good governance have a positive and reasonable impact on economic 
growth, namely law enforcement (law) and political stability (stb), although for the 
latter p = 0.166. For some other elements the data shows a negative correlation 
(governance efficiency and regulatory framework), while for some others, statistical 
data do not provide a meaningful response (governance accountability and anti-
corruption measures). In this case we may return to the literature. Kurtz and Shrank 
(2006) argue that the positive correlation of economic growth and good governance, 
cannot always be evident. Their arguments are related to two main problems. The 
first is related to governance indicators assessments, which are based on 
perceptions and may have a biased content. The second problem is based in the 
assumption that not only good governance affects economic growth, but overall 
economic growth and development can bring improvements in governance. 
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According to them, there may be other casual and unobserved factors, which make 
‘…select countries into high-growth/good governance or low-growth/mal-
governance equilibrium’ (Kurtz and Schrank, 2007). 
As underlined above, the aim of this paper is not to discuss the content of the 
indicators set by the World Bank and they are taken for granted. However, if we go 
to the data of Annexes 1 and 2, it can be said that the economic growth for the 
Western Balkan countries was not based particularly in good governance, such as 
improvements in administrative business regulation, anti-corruption measures or 
efficiency of public services. In fact, this conclusion is clearly shown in the graphs 
above regarding good governance indicators (Graphs 1 to 6) and economic growth 
(Graphs 7 to 8). Although the growth has been stable (at least until 2008), the 
majority of good governance indicators were negative ones with little improvement. 
In this regard, the econometric model presented in function (1) is modified, including 
in it also the performance of economic growth in previous years. In this way, 
economic growth is seen not only dependent on factors set in function (1), but also 
from the development in previous years. Analysis is done in two options. In the first 
way (a), the economic growth in the current period is seen depending on the 
indicators and other variables in function (1) taken from the same year, but also on 
the growth of GDP per capita, respectively in the first, second and third preceding 
years. While the second option (b), economic growth is seen depending on the 
indicators of governance and other variables in function (1) taken from the previous 
year, and the growth of GDP per capita respectively in the first, second and third 
preceding years. 
In option (a) processing data in STATA has brought the results shown in Annex 3. 
Here gdcap1, gdcap2 and gdcap3 represent the increase in GDP per capita 
respectively in the first, second and third years before the actual period. The data 
show that the dependence of economic growth from some aspects of good 
governance cannot be considered statistically significant (acc, stb, rre, crr and 
extgdlog). Not taking these variables into account, the regression is repeated and 
results are presented in Annex 4. Here, all variables are statistically significant (p 
<0.05). The data show an anomaly regarding the correlation of the economic growth 
from governance efficiency (eff) and the initial level of income (log96). On the other 
hand, law enforcement (variable law) has a significant impact on economic growth 
in the same period, also this growth depends on the growth in the previous years 
(gdpcap1 and gdpcap2) and economic development in OECD countries (gdpoecd). 
Compared with the analysis previously done, in this case, the variant (a) shows that 
the ratio of capital formation to GDP is replaced with the variables that reflect 
economic growth in previous years. This is acceptable because both these variables 
in fact present the same thing: the basis of economic development in prior years. 
Compared to the previous regression, the determination coefficient (R-sq) is 0.54, 
which is larger compared to the 0.32 in the regression shown, in Annex 2. 
In the variant (b), the economic growth (GDP/capita) in a period, depends not only 
on the growth in previous periods, but also on the governance in these periods. 
Alternatively, the economic impact of the governance is seen in growth of GDP in 
the next years. The first results of the regression are presented in Annex 5, while the 
final results (after eliminating variable that are not statistically significant), appear in 
Annex 6. 
In this case growth is influenced positively by the governance accountability index 
(acc), economic growth in the previous year and economic growth in developing 
countries (gdpoecd). Although statistically acceptable, the data show an abnormal 
dependence of GDP growth per capita, from the regulatory reforms (rre). The 
determination coefficient here is above 0.54. 
In the analysis, it is also taken into consideration the assumption of correlation of 
economic growth on specific governance indicators, seeing their dependence on the 
37 
 
Pere ● Governance and economic development of Western Balkan countries  
growth of GDP per capita in the first, second and third preceding years. It means 
analyzing the dependence in inverse: the impact of economic growth on improving 
the governance indicators. Also in this case, data do not show logical dependence 
or the conclusions are not statistically significant. 
Conclusions 
Despite a relatively long duration of social and economic transformation, the 
improvement of governance indicators in the Western Balkan countries during the 
period 1996-2012 has been slow and below the average level of assessment. 
Croatia makes an exception, which is above the average level indicators and 
positive. From six main indicators defined by the World Bank as indicators of good 
governance, about four of these are still negative for six countries (from seven in 
total). The negative value has held in the particular indicators of ‘corruption control’; 
‘law enforcement’, ‘governance efficiency’ and ‘political stability and lack of violence’. 
Regarding the correlation of economic growth from good governance, the analysis 
of regression for the period 1996-2012 presents a messy dependence of economic 
growth on the good governance level. In some cases the dependence of these 
indicators is negative (governance efficiency, regulatory framework and corruption), 
while in some other cases it is not statistically significant. Croatia with the most 
positive indices in governance has the most modest growth compared to the other 
countries. 
Not all aspects of good governance have the same impact on economic growth and 
for some of them this impact is faster than others. The statistical analysis shows that 
political stability, absence of violence (stb) and the strengthening of law enforcement 
(law) affect the growth of the same period, but it is not evident for other indicators. 
Statistical analysis shows that some aspects of good governance can be better 
identified for their impact on economic growth, displaced in time. Governance 
accountability (acc) affects economic growth in future periods, which means it has a 
slower future impact. 
Taking for granted the assessment of governance indicators, analysis conducted in 
paper shows that the impact of good governance in economic development of the 
Western Balkan countries can be interpreted only in the long term. It is not clear from 
the overall evidence of this relation for the short period of 10 to12 years. 
For the Western Balkans, statistical analysis shows that there is no significant 
dependency of the improvement of governance indicators on the economic growth 
in the previous periods. Thus, the assumption that governance can be improved as 
a result of economic development in general, at least for the analyzed period, 1996-
2012, is not confirmed. 
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Appendix 
Annex 1. Growth of GDP per capita and governance indicators 
                                                                               
         rho            0   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    8.0817479
     sigma_u            0
                                                                              
       _cons    -85.86295   46.36586    -1.85   0.064    -176.7384    5.012459
     gdpoecd     1.085017    .497624     2.18   0.029     .1096917    2.060342
      gcflog     25.54283    8.57272     2.98   0.003     8.740604    42.34505
    extgdlog    -4.841363   13.70471    -0.35   0.724    -31.70211    22.01938
       log96      18.2358   8.855933     2.06   0.039     .8784875    35.59311
         crr    -.5827184   1.619033    -0.36   0.719    -3.755966    2.590529
         law     3.181707   1.871013     1.70   0.089    -.4854125    6.848826
         rre    -2.587529   1.456549    -1.78   0.076    -5.442312    .2672543
         eff    -8.219662    2.33311    -3.52   0.000    -12.79247   -3.646851
         stb     1.736147   1.164004     1.49   0.136    -.5452597    4.017553
         acc     .6123372    1.34217     0.46   0.648    -2.018269    3.242943
                                                                              
      gdpcap        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(10)      =     47.24
       overall = 0.3519                                        max =        14
       between = 0.8939                                        avg =      14.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.3099                         Obs per group: min =        14
Group variable: code                            Number of groups   =         7
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =        98
. xtreg gdpcap acc stb eff rre law crr log96 extgdlog gcflog gdpoecd, re
41 
 
Pere ● Governance and economic development of Western Balkan countries  
Annex 2 Growth of GDP per capita and good governance indicators (statistically 
significant) 
                                                                               
         rho            0   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    7.9839582
     sigma_u            0
                                                                              
       _cons    -96.01482   30.81755    -3.12   0.002    -156.4161   -35.61354
     gdpoecd     1.022126     .47998     2.13   0.033     .0813824    1.962869
      gcflog     24.46416   7.894859     3.10   0.002     8.990521     39.9378
       log96      19.2147   7.743185     2.48   0.013     4.038337    34.39106
         law     2.791953   1.242372     2.25   0.025     .3569483    5.226958
         rre    -2.579118   1.348562    -1.91   0.056    -5.222252    .0640152
         eff    -7.944702   2.236542    -3.55   0.000    -12.32824   -3.561161
         stb     1.539992    1.11113     1.39   0.166    -.6377835    3.717767
                                                                              
      gdpcap        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(7)       =     48.03
       overall = 0.3480                                        max =        14
       between = 0.7939                                        avg =      14.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.3160                         Obs per group: min =        14
Group variable: code                            Number of groups   =         7
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =        98
. xtreg gdpcap stb eff rre law log96 gcflog gdpoecd, re
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Annex 3. Variation of GDP growth from governance indicators in actual period and 
economic growth in previous years 
                                                                               
         rho            0   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    6.6936012
     sigma_u            0
                                                                              
       _cons    -32.55872   39.33558    -0.83   0.408     -109.655     44.5376
     gdpoecd     1.127075   .4185967     2.69   0.007      .306641     1.94751
    extgdlog    -1.686349    11.1711    -0.15   0.880    -23.58131    20.20861
       log96     10.05325   7.616994     1.32   0.187    -4.875785    24.98228
     gdpcap3     .4760815   .0799733     5.95   0.000     .3193367    .6328262
     gdpcap2      .283829    .081155     3.50   0.000     .1247681    .4428899
     gdpcap1     .0781734   .1262794     0.62   0.536    -.1693297    .3256765
         crr    -.8051266   1.343033    -0.60   0.549    -3.437423     1.82717
         law     2.347946    1.57322     1.49   0.136    -.7355079      5.4314
         rre    -.8417507   1.151782    -0.73   0.465    -3.099202    1.415701
         eff    -4.400297   2.050324    -2.15   0.032    -8.418858    -.381737
         stb     .5715056   .9906176     0.58   0.564    -1.370069     2.51308
         acc     1.067719   1.107259     0.96   0.335    -1.102469    3.237908
                                                                              
      gdpcap        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(12)      =    111.50
       overall = 0.5674                                        max =        14
       between = 0.9560                                        avg =      14.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.5441                         Obs per group: min =        14
Group variable: code                            Number of groups   =         7
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =        98
> poecd, re
. xtreg gdpcap acc stb eff rre law crr gdpcap1 gdpcap2 gdpcap3 log96 extgdlog gd
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Annex 4. Variation of GDP growth from governance indicators in actual period and 
economic growth in previous years (statistically significant) 
 
Annex 5. Variation of GDP growth, from governance indicators and economic 
growth in previous years 
 
                                                                              
         rho            0   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e     6.510881
     sigma_u            0
                                                                              
       _cons    -40.57649   19.58747    -2.07   0.038    -78.96723   -2.185744
     gdpoecd     1.071694   .3898761     2.75   0.006     .3075512    1.835837
       log96     11.62513   5.831543     1.99   0.046     .1955118    23.05474
     gdpcap3     .4842415   .0765319     6.33   0.000     .3342418    .6342413
     gdpcap2     .3166192   .0671942     4.71   0.000      .184921    .4483174
         law     2.068566   .9828004     2.10   0.035     .1423121    3.994819
         eff     -4.63443   1.490092    -3.11   0.002    -7.554956   -1.713903
                                                                              
      gdpcap        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(6)       =    113.85
       overall = 0.5558                                        max =        14
       between = 0.8747                                        avg =      14.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.5392                         Obs per group: min =        14
Group variable: code                            Number of groups   =         7
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =        98
. xtreg gdpcap eff law gdpcap2 gdpcap3 log96 gdpoecd, re
                                                                              
         rho            0   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    2.6655707
     sigma_u            0
                                                                              
       _cons    -4.077269   9.321261    -0.44   0.662     -22.3466    14.19207
     gdpoecd     .5632867   .1694072     3.33   0.001     .2312547    .8953187
       log96     1.703298    2.76614     0.62   0.538    -3.718237    7.124834
     gdpcap3     .1017265   .0331055     3.07   0.002     .0368409    .1666121
     gdpcap2     .0098275   .0335076     0.29   0.769    -.0558462    .0755012
     gdpcap1     .0496679   .0514519     0.97   0.334     -.051176    .1505118
         crr    -.8081095   .5375017    -1.50   0.133    -1.861593    .2453745
         law    -.9459614   .6012155    -1.57   0.116    -2.124322    .2323994
         rre    -.7157147   .4764095    -1.50   0.133     -1.64946    .2180308
         eff    -.3183857   .8567224    -0.37   0.710    -1.997531    1.360759
         stb     .3111996   .4266384     0.73   0.466    -.5249963    1.147396
         acc     1.713261   .4679364     3.66   0.000     .7961226      2.6304
                                                                              
     gdpcapI        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(11)      =     52.47
       overall = 0.3991                                        max =        13
       between = 0.7289                                        avg =      13.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.3696                         Obs per group: min =        13
Group variable: code                            Number of groups   =         7
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =        91
> e
. xtreg gdpcapI acc stb eff rre law crr gdpcap1 gdpcap2 gdpcap3 log96 gdpoecd, r
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Annex 6. Variation of GDP growth from governance indicators and economic 
growth in previous years (statistically significant) 
                                                                               
         rho    .10568209   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    2.6058534
     sigma_u     .8957869
                                                                              
       _cons     2.163959   .5591069     3.87   0.000      1.06813    3.259789
     gdpoecd     .5023464   .1614302     3.11   0.002     .1859491    .8187438
     gdpcap3     .0961148   .0314896     3.05   0.002     .0343964    .1578332
         rre    -1.683388   .3976871    -4.23   0.000     -2.46284   -.9039352
         acc     .8629871   .3567695     2.42   0.016     .1637318    1.562242
                                                                              
     gdpcapI        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(4)       =     45.28
       overall = 0.3102                                        max =        13
       between = 0.2080                                        avg =      13.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.3797                         Obs per group: min =        13
Group variable: code                            Number of groups   =         7
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =        91
. xtreg gdpcapI acc rre gdpcap3 gdpoecd, re
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